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were faced, therefore, with a dilemma: they could either reject the earth's centrality and abandon a vital part of Aristotelian physics, or they could accept a cosmology that was untenable from the perspective of the astronomers.12
When we incorporate into this discussion the ontology of tem- argues that one must accept the existence of the potential infinite, that is, entities which can be increased without limit. In this way he claims the infinite can be applied to time.
III. Theological Considerations
How do these paradigms affect Jewish discussions of cosmology and temporality? Once we superimpose a theological framework sue, cf. Grant, "Cosmology," 280ff; Pierre Duhem, Le Systeme Du Monde, (Paris, 1913 (Paris, -1959 .
12 Cf. Grant "Cosmology," 281. Grant goes on to describe a third alternative as well, namely one in which additional orbs are introduced according to which the variation in planetary distances was incorporated into a system of concentric planetary spheres. In this way both Aristotelian and Ptolemaic systems are salvaged. onto these issues, matters take on an additional complication. For example, can the universe be both eternal and created; can the universe be infinite and yet contain existent creatures; can there be a first instant of creation? Clearly an answer to these questions will depend upon the texts we examine. From the perspective of temporality perhaps the most important word of Scripture is b'reishit, "in the beginning." The very term b'reishit designates the fact that there was a beginning, i.e. temporality has been introduced if only in the weakest sense that this creative act occupies a period of time. That in itself raises questions having to do not only with the beginning of time, but with the issue of creation ex nihilo vs. the eternity of the universe as well.
Out of these passages emerge several key issues which will occupy medieval rabbinic commentators and philosophers. First is how to interpret the term b'reishit: does the term already imply temporality, that is, does creation occur in time, or is time created along with the creation of the universe. Second, how do we understand the word yom, day, on day one, if those astronomical markers most associated with measuring day and night have not been created until day four; and finally, what general metaphysical sense emerges from these questions about the nature of time in this cosmology? With respect to the first question, some rabbis postulated the pre-existence of time before creation. The issue is crystallized in the following talmudic passage:
It is also possible for us to explain that when the heavens and earth emerged from nothingness into the something which is mentioned in the first verse, time came into being. For although our time consists of minutes and hours which belong to light and darkness, yet from the moment when the "something" came into existence "time" was attached to it. On this assumption heaven and earth were created and remained as they were for the space of a night without light; and He said "let there be light" and there was light, and He decreed that it should remain for the same space of time as the preceding (night) and later should be removed from the elements and so "there was evening and there was morning." '4 This point is reiterated when, commenting on the phrase "And God called the light day," Nachmanides claims that "He states here that time was created and He fixed the span of day and span of night."15 Other interpretations are given as well, contributing to an ongoing commentary tradition to Genesis which is incorporated into subsequent philosophical texts.
IV. Cosmology and Emanation Ontology
Medieval neoplatonism, which was largely based on the writings of Plotinus and Proclus, dates from the ninth century. It provided the philosophical context for the thought of many cultivated Jews of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, and during the Arabic period it was more or less complemented by elements stemming from Islamic religious traditions and some Aristotelian ideas. Serious Jewish thinkers had to deal with Jewish neoplatonism if only because they saw in the speculations of certain neoplatonist philosophies cosmological notions that were quite compatible with their own attempts to characterize the nature of God and God's nature and relation to humans. Although not all Jewish thinkers supported neoplatonism, it was extremely influential on the formation of Jewish thought during the late hellenistic, roman and medieval periods. ' The extant Israeli texts do not give a significant explanation of the concept of God or His creation. As a result, cosmological concepts must be pieced together from isolated discussions. God is described as a perpetually active creator who created the universe ex nihilo and in time, "and in acting is in no need of things outside Him."22 He created the "first substance" and the "truly first genus" without mediator.23 They came into being by His "power"24 or by His "power and will.""2 The simple substances and the sphere are generated from the power and will of the Creator, whereas the bodies are made by nature.26 Israeli treats "power" and "will" as aspects of God identical with his essence or being-they are not hypostases as they are in the Long Theology and later neoplatonists such as Ibn Gabirol and Judah Ha-Levi. In general Israeli's cosmology describes the various stages of being as a series of emanations, or hypostases, from the intellect; the intellect itself is constituted by the union of first matter and first form, which are "created" by the power and will of God. Israeli thus upholds the notion of creation ex nihilo in the case of the first three hypostases, while adopting the Plotinian concept of emanation for the rest. Israeli distinguishes three cosmological processes. The first, creation ex nihilo, is used only for intellect which is created from matter and form, and is due to an act of power and 40 Note the following passages in the Introduction to the Guide: "For my purpose is that the truths be glimpsed and then again be concealed, so as not to oppose that divine purpose which one cannot possibly oppose and which has concealed from the vulgar among the people those truths especially requisite for His apprehension." Also, "God, may He be exalted, knows that I have never ceased to be exceedingly apprehensive about setting down those things that I wish to set down in this treatise. For they are concealed things; none of them has been set down in any book..." Maimonides further describes seven sorts of contradictions commonly found in philosophical works and suggests that two of these (#5 and #7) may be used specifically to conceal potentially controversial or even heretical doctrines from the masses. He then states that any contradictions found in the Guide itself are intentional and are of type #5 or #7. Finally, Maimonides characterizes the doctrine of creation as a potentially volatile, and certainly an extremely challenging, topic. (1.1), (1.4), (1.6), (1.7) and (1.11) appear to undercut these implications. My own reading is an amplification of Langermann's point that in contradistinction to implicit suggestions in II.24, "Maimonides does regard the true configuration of the heavens as something humanly attainable.""64 On this reading, Maimonides' point is epistemological rather than ontological: it is not that the heavenly spheres are per se inaccessible to the human intellect, but rather that nobody yet has determined their true configuration.65 The key passages for this interpretation are (1.7), (1.9) and (1.11), all of which emphasize the epistemological limits of human intellect: (1.7) tells us that the heavens are ontologically beyond human knowledge; (1.9) warns against pushing human intellect beyonds its dispositional limits; and (1.11) suggests that it is not inconceivable that some mind may find a demonstration of these matters.
In order to appreciate these points more fully, let us distinguish four different ways in which humans can be said not to know an en- maintain that the topic of creation is beyond rational demonstration. Gersonides, on the other hand, devotes many chapters in Milhamot VI to proving that the Platonic theory of creation out of an eternal formless matter is rationally demonstrable. Further, the two disagree over the relation between the superlunar and sublunar spheres. As we have seen, Maimonides has claimed that no valid inference can be drawn from the nature of the sublunar sphere to that of the superlunar sphere. Gersonides, however, rejects the metaphysical bite to the distinction, and argues that inasmuch as both spheres contain material elements, what we know about creation is based on astronomy, and astronomy is fundamentally no different a human science than physics.74 Astronomy can only be pursued as a science by "one who is both a mathematician and a natural philosopher, for he can be aided by both of these sciences and take from them whatever is needed to perfect his work."75 Gersonides sees the ultimate function of astronomy to understand God. Astronomy, he tells us, is instructive not only by virtue of its exalted subject matter, but also because of its utility to the other sciences. By studying the orbs and stars, we are led ineluctably to a fuller knowledge and appreciation of God.76
VI. Cosmological Implications of Creation
Underlying Maimonides' discussion, as we have seen, has been the tension between the exoteric and esoteric dimensions to his writings. Nowhere is this tension felt more keenly than in the context of Maimonides' discussion of creation of the universe. Recent discussion has centered around Maimonides' taxonomy of creation and prophecy theories, both of which appear, at least on the basis of Maimonides' analysis, to be related. So that when readers of the Guide turn to chapters II.13-30 devoted to creation, they have already been forewarned by the author to expect at least a modicum of ambiguity at best, or outright deception at worst.
In 11 Arguing that creation out of nothing is incompatible with the facts of physical reality, he adopts a Platonic model of matter drawn ultimately from the Timaeus. The opening verses of Genesis I are used to distinguish two types of material reality: geshem and homer rishon.91 Totally devoid of form, geshem is the primordial matter out of which the universe was created. Since it is not informed, it is not capable of motion or rest; and since it is characterized by negation, geshem is inert and chaotic92. This primordial matter is identified with the "primeval waters" described in Genesis 1.2 (tohu, tehom and mayim). However, Gersonides points out that geshem does not itself exemplify absolute non-being, but rather is an intermediary between being and non-being.93
In contrast to geshem, homer rishon is the second type of reality. Homer rishon is understood in the Aristotelian sense as a substratum which is allied to form. Homer rishon, or matter, is inferior to form and hence cannot be known in itself. It contains within itself the potentiality to receive forms, yet has no actuality of its own.94 Inasmuch as it does not contain its own actuality, homer rishon is not an ontologically independent entity. In Milhamot VI.2.7 Gersonides compares this matter to darkness, for just as darkness is the absence of light, so too this matter represents the absence of form or shape.
Homer rishon plays a crucial role in Gersonides' astronomy as well. Gersonides agrees with his predecessors that each of the astral bodies occupies its own celestial sphere, with the stars all residing in one sphere.95 He further rejects as untenable the view that there exists a diurnal sphere deprived of stars which carries the world in one simple movement.96 But how do we account for the interaction between these spheres? The celestial spheres are concentric and contiguous, and in principle we might expect that they move in unison. However, as Gersonides has already pointed out, each has its own proper movement, and often these movements are in conflict. In order to account for the independence of each sphere, Gersonides argues that between each sphere there exists a fluid body which determines the movements of the spheres.97 This body, uninformed and without movement of its own, is described as "the matter that does not keep its shape" (hageshem habilti shomer temunato) and lies between the spheres of the astral bodies.98 It is the very same homer rishon described above. Its function is to assure the motion of the celestial bodies and precludes the possibility of one planetary motion affecting another: "it is clearly appropriate that there be [enough] fluid between the spheres of one planet and the spheres of another such that a motionless layer may remain in its midst to make sure that the motions are not confused. or more pointedly, the final cause of the heavenly bodies. Maimonides clearly asserts that "governance overflows from the deity, may he be exalted, to the intellects according to their rank."125 From this general overflow, however, it should not be concluded that the more perfect entity exists for the sake of the less perfect entity. Freudenthal argues, for example, that Maimonides' theological cosmology precludes astrology, largely on the grounds that for Maimonides, celestial beings do not exist for the sake of humans, but rather for their own sake.'26 As Freudenthal argues, Maimonides' world view is unfavorable to a science predicting the effects upon humans of the celestial bodies. Rather astrology is much more embedded in a world view in which the heavenly bodies exist for the sake of sublunar entities.127
In contradistinction to Maimonides, Gersonides accepts both of these assumptions. His astral determinism is explicitly developed in two contexts: in book II of Milhamot he interweaves astrological motifs into his discussion of divine providence and prophecy, while in Book V astrology occupies a central role in the context of his cosmological speculations. Let us look first at the discussions in Milhamot II, since they set the tone for the subsequent investigations of Book V.
In Milhamot II Gersonides is concerned to explain how divine knowledge operates, and to what extent divine foreknowledge of future contingents affects human choice.128 His major thesis is that divine knowledge is predicated to a great extent upon knowledge of the heavenly bodies, which bodies are in turn "systematically directed toward his [man's] preservation and guidance so that all his activities and thoughts are ordered by them.""'29 Because of the major role played by the heavenly bodies, it turns out that often astrologers, whose function it is to study these bodies, are able to predict human events correctly. The technical aspects of this system will be described more fully Having articulated the ordering power of the astral bodies, Gersonides describes in Milhamot V.3 the separate intellects and the spheres that they move. The movers emanate from God who is construed as the "First Separate Intellect."'13 They are ordered in a rational system which governs the sublunar domain. If there were no one first intellect, Gersonides argues, the rational order we see in the heavens would be the result of chance, which is unacceptable. The agent intellect thus functions as the link between these celestial bodies and human affairs. Why is it that certain communications are received more clearly than others? A constitutionally perfect imaginative faculty receives information from both dominant and weak heavenly bodies. By 'weak', Gersonides means that certain bodies are too weak both to bring about events on earth as well as to transmit information about these events. Hence he concludes that information about the future emanate "from the dominant body in the particular proper face (panim) in which it has dominance but not from any of the attending planets (ha-meshartim)."'139 But to consitutionally imperfect imaginative faculties, the information received is only from the dominant heavenly bodies. Hence the overall quality of the information received will differ in the two cases.
Gersonides does admit that on occasion human choice is able to contravene the celestial bodies: "[our intellect and choice] have the power to move us contrary to that which is determined by the heavenly bodies."'14 Nevertheless this intervention is rare, and true contingency is a rare state of affairs indeed in Gersonides' ontology.'41 Gersonides presents an argument to show 135 The separate intellects which attach to each body are described in more detail in Milhamot V.3.6-7. we understand, Gersonides claims, how the activity of heating reaches earth from the sun, we can understand how the particular activities of the other stars reach the sublunar realm as well. By explaining the efficient cause as the light or radiation of the stars, Gersonides can account for weak or strong effects. As Langerman has pointed out, Gersonides' account furnishes the basis for the introduction of astrological causation into natural philosophy.146 In Milhamot V.2.8 Gersonides lays out six astrological principles which affect his general cosmological scheme. These can be summarized as follows. First, each astral body exercises a different influence specific to it. Second, astral influence depends upon its position in the zodiac (galgal hamazalot). Third, the longer a star stays in one place in the zodiac, the greater its effect because of the strength of its luminosity. Fourth, astral influence is dependent upon its inclination to the north or to the south; its effect will be strongest when it is in the middle, as evidenced by the sun, whose heat is strongest when it is at the Tropic of Cancer as opposed to being at the Tropic of Capricorn. Fifth, the greater the radiation or luminosity of a star, the stronger will be its influence. And finally, the closer to earth a star is, the stronger will be its influence.147 These principles function as the underpinnings of his general astronomy as well.
V. Concluding Comments
We are now in a position to summarize our findings. Working within a framework which upheld the infinity of time, Aristotle posited an eternal universe which had no temporal beginning. Jewish philosophers, however, are committed to a cosmology in which the Deity willed the universe to exist. Unwilling to reject Aristotle's ontology of time altogether, Jewish philosophers posit a resolution which can be construed as a version of eternal creation. Neoplatonists such as Isaac Israeli (and others) introduce a cosmology which incorporates elements of creation along with necessary emanation. We have seen that Maimonides is sympathetic to an Aristotelian theory of time. Much of his effort, moreover, has been aimed at showing that the Scriptural view of creation is inconsistent with this theory. And yet, unwilling to support Aristotle's denial of creation altogether, Maimonides supports an eternally existing world which has been sustained by a Creator, but not in a temporal context. Gersonides is less willing ostensibly to compromise the temporal beginning of the universe, and so he creatively reinterprets Aristotle's notion of the instant in such a way as to allow for a temporal beginning to creation out of a preexistent matter. In this way he has retained a first instant to the act of creation in light of the notion of an eternally beginningless substance whose existence ontologically proceeds that of created composites.
Against the backdrop of these cosmological discussions, issues of astrology and astronomy acquire a particular urgency. We have noted the theological implications of judicial astrology, particularly with respect to issues of providence, fatalism and human freedom. But the interrelations between astrology and astronomy raise broader epistemological questions, especially concerning the limits of human knowledge. Do the heavens represent the "final frontier" which human intellect cannot penetrate, or is the science of astronomy simply one more topic in the arsenal of human understanding? These questions, which continue to challenge scientists to this very day, constitute the intellectual agenda for medieval Jewish philosophers.
ABSTRACT
In this paper I shall examine the philosophical cosmology of medieval Jewish thinkers as developed against the backdrop of their views on time and creation. I shall concentrate upon the Neoplatonic and Aristotelian traditions, with a particular eye to the interweaving of astronomy, cosmology and temporality. This interweaving occurs in part because of the influence of Greek cosmological and astronomical texts upon Jewish philosophers. The tension between astronomy and cosmology is best seen in Maimonides' discussion of creation. Gersonides, on the other hand, is more willing to incorporate astronomical material into his cosmological thinking. By examining these motifs, we shall arrive at a greater understanding of the dimension of temporality within Jewish philosophy.
